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1 Introduction
The genesis of this paper was John Reeves's and Matthew
Thompson's well-received paper from the 49th Annual Institute,
Significant Cases Governing the Onshore OperatingAgreement,2 I which
sought to collect cases that have interpreted the language of the model
form operating agreements. The suggestion of the program chairs was
that I might do a similar analysis of farmout agreements.
Ultimately, however, I determined that a collection of cases
prepared in the same way as the Reeves and Thompson article was not
feasible. First, I have already written extensively about farmout
agreements and I did not want to repeat myself. Second, and more
important, there are no model form farmout agreements. While farmout
agreements tend to share common structures, they do not use standard
language. Therefore, farmout agreements do not lend themselves easily
to the same kind of structured, clause-by-clause analysis that can be done
on operating agreements.
Farmout agreements do present, however, frequent and recurring
drafting problems. Some of those I have discussed in earlier papers. But
cases decided since my earlier work throw new light on those problems,
as well as illustrate some that I did not discuss. These cases and the
problems they illustrate will be the focus of this paper.
This compilation is subject to several limitations. First, the initial
research was done in October, 1998, so later-reported cases may not be
included. Second, in the interest of brevity I have discarded cases that I
did not think interesting; I recognize, however, that one person's poison
is another's sustenance. Third, I have addressed only those cases that
arose in the context of farmout agreements, though similar issues are
Copyright John S. Lowe 1999. This paper was presented initially at the 50th
Annual Oil and Gas Law and Taxation Institute of the Southwestern Legal Foundation in
February 1999 and will be published by Matthew Bender & Co. The author gratefully
acknowledges the assistance of Randall G. Quick and John A. Thomas, third-year law
students at Southern Methodist University, in the preparation of this paper, and the
continuing support of the Hutchison Endowment.
2
49th Oil and Gas Inst. 2-1 (Matthew Bender 1998).
3
"Analyzing Oil and Gas Farmout Agreements," 41 SOUTHWESTERN L. J. 759
(1987); reprinted at 25 PUB. LAND & RES. DIG. 5 (1988) (hereinafter referred to as
"SMU"); "The Meaning of 'Payout' in Oil and Gas Farmout Agreements," 10th
EASTERN MIN. L. INST. 13-1 (Matthew Bender 1989).
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often presented by other contracts.4 Fourth, it is inevitable that I will
omit5 or misstates a case that someone thinks is important. Finally, since
this paper is case-oriented, it is not necessarily cohesive. For those
looking for a quick overview of developments in farmout agreement
litigation over the past decade, however, I offer this analysis as a place to
begin.

II. Contract Formation and Interpretation
An oil and gas farmout agreement is an agreement by one who owns
drilling rights to assign all or a portion of those rights to another in return
for drilling and testing on the property. 6 The individual or entity that
owns the lease, called the "farmor" or "farmoutor," is said to "farm out"
its rights. The person or entity that receives the right to drill, referred to
as the "farmee" or "farmoutee," is said to have "farmed in" to the lease
or to have entered into a "farm-in agreement."
Farmout disputes are common. Parties often negotiate farmout
agreements orally or through an exchange of letters. Indeed, farmout
agreements are often entered into in the form of and referred to as "letter
agreements.7 Disagreements often arise over whether the parties have
formed a binding contract.8 And, even when the parties agree that there is
a contract, they often disagree about the terms of the agreement.

[1] The Statute of Frauds
The statute of frauds is a potent barrier to claims that a contract has
been formed or that it means something other than what it says.9 Several
Nonetheless, I started with more than 200 cases, and I reviewed well over 300 in
the course of writing this paper.
s
It is very easy to overlook conditional-assignment or term-assignment farmouts in
legal research, because those instruments and the disputes that arise from them may not
even use the term "farmout." See, e.g., Riley v. Merriweather, 780 S.W.2d 919, 111
O&GR 336 (Tex. App. -El Paso 1989, writ denied), discussed infra part .03[2].
6
EUGENE 0. KUNTZ, JOHN S. LOWE, OWEN L. ANDERSON, ERNEST E.
SMITH, & DAVID E. PIERCE, CASES AND MATERIALS ON OIL AND GAS LAW
596 (3d ed.1998).
See, e.g., Petrocana, Inc. v. Margo, Inc., 577 So.2d 274,276, 115 O&GR 84 (La.
App.--3d Cir. 1991). Agreements other than farmouts may also be called "letter
agreements," however. See, e.g., Raydon Exploration, Inc. v. Ladd, 902 F.2d 1496, 109
O&GR 70 (10th Cir. 1990) (discussing a dispute involving a "farmout agreement" and a
"letter agreement") and Billingsley v. Bach Energy Corporation, 588 So.2d 786, 118
O&GR 70 (La.App.--2d Cir. 1991) ("letter agreement" used to describe an agreement to
pay a finders fee).
8
See SMU, supra n.3, at 782-783. See gerierally E. Dale Trower, "Enforceability
of
Letters of Intent and Other Preliminary Agreements," 24 ROCKY MTN .MIN. L. INST.
347 (1978) (discussing whether parties have formed binding contract or have merely
engaged in preliminary negotiations).
9
As I have discussed in SMU, supra n. 3, at 785, most states classify farmout
agreements as interests in land, subject to the statute of frauds, whether the interest
created by an oil and gas lease is viewed as an estate in land or as a profit a prendre and
4
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cases from several jurisdictions in the last ten years have turned on the
statute's requirement of a writing.' 0 In PetrocanaInc. v. Margo, Inc.,I
the court relied upon the statute of frauds to bar parol evidence of a
verbal agreement to extend the time for exercise of an area of mutual
interest provision in a farmout agreement.12 In Keesun Partnersv. Ferdig
Oil Company, Inc., " the Montana Supreme Court upheld a summary
judgment based upon the statute rejecting a claim that Ferdig had farmed
out to Keesun in reliance upon oral representations that Keesun would
enter into a long-term gas processing contract with Ferdig.14 Similarly, in
B & A Pipeline Co. v. Dorney,15 the Fifth Circuit held that a farmor had

not partially performed an allegedly oral gas contract so as to avoid the
statute, where the farmor had chosen to market his gas through the
farmee but retained the right to take production in kind. 16 In Crowder v.
Tri-C Resources, Inc., 7 the statute barred enforcement of a supplemental
area of mutual interest agreement to farmed-out acreage. 1718 The
supplemental agreement was referred to in a letter signed by the party to
be charged with its burden and an outline of the affected land was drawn
on a plat, but the party to be charged did not sign the plat and the plat did
not refer to the letter, and the letter neither referred to the plat nor
described the land.' 9 In Texaco Inc. v. Mercury Exploration Co., 20 the
Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals applied North Dakota law to conclude
that the time for performance of a written farmout agreement had been
not been extended orally. 2 1 Although the farmout agreement specifically
whether the form of the contract is bilateral unilateral contract.
to
Compliance with the statute of frauds does not require a formal contract.
Compliance occurs if there is "some memorandum or note thereof ... in writing, and
signed by the party to be charged therewith" or that party's agent. 8 Stat. 405. § 4.24 Car.
2. Ch. 3 § 4; Lynch v. Davis. 181 Conn. 434,435 A.2d 977,980 (1980).
"
577 So.2d 274 (La.App.--3rd Cir. 1991). 1 1Id. at 278. 12816P.2d417(Mont.1991).
12
Id. At 278.
13
816 P. 2d 417 (Mont. 1991)
14
The trial court had held that "there is nothing before the Court that would take the
contract between the parties, if there were one, out of the statue of frauds." Id. At 420.
The Supreme Court did not reach the statute of frauds issue, because it found that the
parties had not reached mutual assent on all essential terms of the contract. Id. At 422423.
15
904 F.2d 996, 112 O&GR 103 (5th Cir. 1990).
16
904 F.2d at 999-1000.
17
821 S,W,2d, 393, 118 O&GR 538 (Tex. App. - Houston [l" Dist.] 1991).
821 S.W.2d at 396-397.
Id.
20
994 F.2d. 463, 124 O&GR 70 (8th Cir. 1993).
21
Texaco and Mercury entered into a farmout agreement under which Mercury was to
drill three wells before December 31, 1990. 994 F.2d at 464. Mercury failed to complete
the wells before the deadline, and refused to pay the $150,000 in liquidated damages
18
'9
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provided that modifications were to be in writing, North Dakota statutory
law permits waiver of a writing requirement and oral modification where
"the party performing has incurred a detriment which he was not
obligated by the original contract to incur. 22 The court refused to apply
the doctrine because Mercury gave up no legal rights, incurred no
detriment, and did not change its position.23 It also found no evidence
that Texaco should be equitably estopped to assert the writing
requirement. 24
Authority of an agent is another aspect of the statute of frauds. 25 In
In re Manville Forest Products Corporation,26 the court applied the
statute's requirement that a corporate employee have express, written
authority to bind the corporation in transactions involving real property 27
to find a written farmout agreement not binding. 28 The court also refused
to apply the apparent authority doctrine,29 finding that the doctrine does
not extend to real estate transactions.3 0
What each of these cases underscores is that fundamentals count.
While a contract may be informal and concise, a "lawyered" agreement
is more likely to be enforceable and to avoid dispute. These cases
illustrate the importance of putting agreements in writing with clear
drafting (and the clear thinking that is the prerequisite to clear drafting).
That is what lawyers are paid to do.3 1

provided by the agreement. Id. At 465. Mercury asserted as a defense that Texaco had
orally agreed to an extension of time for performance. The federal district court granted
Texaco summary judgment. The Eight Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed, explored in its
opinion the doctrine of the "executed oral agreement."
22
Id. At 465, citing N.D. Cent. Code § 9-09-06 (1987).
23

Id.

24

Id. At 466.
See the discussion at SMU, supra n. 3, at 785. See also Tex. Bus. & Com. Code
Ann § 26.01 (West 1998).
26
89 B.R. 358 (U.S.B.C., S.D. N.Y. 1988), applying Louisiana law.
27
La. Civ.Code.Ann. Art. 2996,2997.
28
89 RR. at 365. The employee had written and recorded authority to deal with up to
1000 acres, but the farmout in question covered 3360 acres. Id.
29
Apparent authority is "[S]uch authority as a principle intentionally or by want of
ordinary care causes or allows third person to believe that agent possesses." Black's Law
Dictionary 88 (5th ed. 1979); see also W. Seavey, Handbook of the Law of Agency §
8(D) (1964) (similar definition of apparent authority).
30
89 RR. at 366-368.
25

See SMU, supra n. 3, at 783-784. See also the discussion at John S. Lowe,
"Developments in Nonregulatory Oil and Gas Law: Are We Moving Toward a Kinder
and Gentler Law of Contracts?," 42nd OIL & GAS INST. §1.02[a] (Matthew Bender
1991).
3'
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[21 The Role of Equity in Farmout Agreements

In limited circumstances, equity may offer protection to the parties
to a farmout-based dispute. The number and diversity of the cases that
my survey turned up surprised me, though in retrospect it should not
have. The informality with which farmout agreements are often
approached by industry parties guarantees that claims for equity will be
made frequently and occasionally granted. 32
Equity may offer limited protection to one who fails to make a
binding agreement. In Vortt Exploration Co., Inc. v. Chevron US.A.,

Inc., the Texas Supreme Court granted quantum meruit relief to a
would-be farmee who provided seismic information in the course of
unsuccessful negotiations. Vortt proposed that Chevron farm out
interests to him, but Chevron refused. Vortt then proposed an operating
agreement.34 Chevron indicated that it might be interested, and
negotiations extended over four years, during which Vortt gave Chevron
confidential seismic services, graphics, and maps to explain his theory of
the property. Instead of finalizing an operating agreement with Vortt,
however, Chevron drilled its own well at the location identified by Vortt,
and then sued Vortt claiming that his leases were invalid. Vortt
counterclaimed seeking quantum meruit. The court of appeals reversed
an award for Vortt because the jury had made no finding that Vortt
furnished the information to Chevron so as to "reasonably notify
Chevron that Vortt expected to be paid for the services and assistance
provided."05 The Texas Supreme Court reversed, reasoning that "the
expected payment does not have to be monetary .... Chevron knew that

Vortt furnished the information with the expectation that a joint
operating agreement would be reached. The parties had negotiated for
over four years trying to achieve that end. 6
My original expectation may have arisen from the fact that I think of - and
frequently describe to my students - a farmout agreement as being a lease of a lease. An
oil and gas lease transfers mineral rights from the mineral owner to someone in the oil
business. A farmout agreement is an additional transfer of those rights, usually with
additional conditions or restrictions. Equity is not an important consideration in oil and
gas lease interpretation - at least when it is invoked by a lessee - probably because
most courts perceive lessees as having knowledge and drafting skills that are superior to
those of lessors. The perception of inequality that may make courts reticent to exercise
their equity powers in lease disputes is not present in farmout quarrels.
3
787 S.W.2d 942, 108 O&GR 126 (1990). Professor Kramer commented on this
case at 108
O&GR 132.
34
787 S.W.2d at 943-944.
35
Id. at 944.
36
Id. at 945. Vortt is subject to a sarcastic dissent by Justice Hecht:
32

"Chevron's representatives never asked to see the information. Vortt's
representative never told Chevron that Vortt expected anything in return ....
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Equity may also provide relief for one who enters into a
burdensome contract. For example, in Uptegraft v. Dome Petroleum
Corp,37 equity permitted a farmor to rescind a farmout agreement. Dome
Petroleum farmed out to Atlas and Atlas drilled wells. Both Dome and
Atlas knew when they contracted that the Uptegrafts held a 2% leasehold
interest in the property. After Atlas had obtained production from two
wells, Dome contacted the Uptegrafts and obtained their ratification of
the farmout agreement. Dome did not inform the Uptegrafts that there
was already production on the tract. In fact, Dome's letter to the
Uptegraft indicated that the advantages of the farmout agreement to
Dome and its cotenants were "evaluation of production in those units
Atlas drills, and protection of leases which would have expired before we
could have drilled in this area. 39The Oklahoma Supreme Court based its
decision upholding rescission of the farmout and assignments on the
constructive fraud of Dome, as cotenant of the Uptegrafts:
co-tenants of an estate in land stand in a relation to each other of
trust and confidence and neither will be permitted to act in hostility
to the other in reference to the joint estate. [citations omitted] Under
such circumstances it is not improper to conclude that once the cotenant decided to communicate with his co-tenant recommending
the execution of the farmout he was duty bound to convey the whole
truth. 40
Or, equity may reinstate rights that have failed. In Hayes v. E. T.S.
Enterprises,Inc., 41 Pogo farmed out to E.T.S. While E.T.S. was drilling,
Pogo released the farmed-out lease. The court held that the evidence
established that the release was the result of a mistake, and that when
there is an execution of a release, rather than a negotiated contract, a
party may claim mistake to revoke the release unless another party, in
good faith, has relied on the release to its detriment.42 To similar effect is
[A]bsolutely the only thing Vortt expected to gain was favorable consideration of
the proposed agreement. ... The information cost Vortt roughly $18,000. The trial
court ordered Chevron to pay Vortt $178,500 for it.
Was ever fainter hope more richly rewarded? For not refusing to look at Vortt's
information, Chevron must pay ten times its cost. The Court's ruling today should
be a tremendous encouragement to benefaction. A frustrated negotiator should
never overlook this tactic in attempting to induce agreement. The recipient of such
charity, however, should beware." Id. at 945-946.
3
764 P.2d 1350, 102 O&GR 557 (Okla. 1988).
38
764 P.2d at 1352.
3
Id.
40
Id. At 1353.
41
809 S.W.2d 652, 119 O&GR 121 (Tex. App. -Amarillo 1991, writ denied).
42
Hayes, the lessor, claimed (1) that Pogo did not make a mistake when executing the
release because its execution was intentional and negligent, and (2) that even if Pogo's
execution was the result of a mistake, the unilateral mistake did not meet the
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Exxon Corp. v. Gann.4 3 Gann purchased all of Exxon's interest in a
single well in Oklahoma, but a mistake in the assignment and bill of sale
resulted in the transfer of two additional wells." Exxon sought
reformation based on the doctrine of mutual mistake. Gann contended
that there was no mutual mistake and that the mistake was the result of
Exxon's own negligence.4 5 Both the district court and the 10th Circuit
held that Gann intended to buy only the one well.46 The 10th Circuit
court refused to overturn the district court's finding of fact, and also
recognized that Oklahoma courts have been reluctant to strictly construe
the requirement that the part seeking reformation must not have been
negligent in forming the contract. Oklahoma courts use a balancing test
to determine if the negligence involved rises to a level of "culpable
negligence" that violates a legal duty in order to bar reformation.47
Equity may even protect one who has technically breached a
contract. In Crescent Drilling & Development, Inc. v. Sealexco, Inc.,48

the court upheld a trial court's application of estoppel and waiver to
award an investor an interest in a well drilled under a farmout agreement,
though the investor had failed to provide funds timely.49 The facts
requirements of "remedial mistake." 809 S.W.2d 654. The court of appeals first found
that Pogo's release was the result of a mistake because the summary judgment evidence
showed that the Pogo official executing the release would not have executed the release
had he known of Pogo's farmout agreement with E.T.S. There was also evidence that the
official's execution of the release was due to a clerical error. Id. at 655. The court also
found that E.T.S.'s evidence in the form of deposition testimony of Pogo's officials and
employees satisfied the stricter summary judgment standard that applied to an "interested
witness"; If a witness is characterized as "interested," as E.T.S.'s witnesses were, then the
evidence must be "clear, positive and direct, otherwise credible and free from
contradictions and inconsistencies, and could have been. readily controverted." Id. at 656.
The court rejected Hayes's claim that the requirements of the "remedial mistake" rule
must have been met for the court to rescind the release. The "remedial mistake" rule
would deny equitable relief unless: (1) the mistake is such that enforcement of the
contract would be unconscionable, (2) the mistake relates to a material feature of the
contract, (3) the mistake occurred despite ordinary care, and (4) the parties can be easily
placed back into the status quo before the contract. The court reasoned that the "remedial
mistake" rule relates only to negotiated contracts and not to the unilateral execution of a
release. The court's rationale was that rescission of a negotiated contract would be
inequitable unless the numbered requirements existed. However, when there is a
unilateral release rather than a negotiated contract, a party only needs to show (1) that the
release was made as a result of a mistake and (2) that another party in good faith did not
rely on the release to its detriment. Id. at 658-659.
43
21 F.3d 1002, 128 Oil & Gas Rep. 532 (10th Cir. 1994). Professor Maxwell
commented on the case at Discussion Notes, 128 O&GR 542.
4
21 F.3d at 1004.
45
Id. at 1005.
46
Id. at 1005-1006.
47
Id at 1006-1007.
48
570 So.2d 151, 113 O&GR 82 (La. App. -3rd Cir. 1990).
49
570 So.2d at 155.
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showed that the company that held the interest had allowed participants
to make elections and payments late as a matter of course, had in fact
accepted and used the late payment, and owed the investor amounts
substantially in excess of the amount due.so To the same effect is
Waldron v. Zapata Exploration Company. s' There, Waldron farmed out
his interests in over 7,500 acres to Zapata Exploration, which promised
to pay $1.3 million and commence drilling by a certain date. 52
Zapata failed to drill by the critical date and an extension, but
instead of suing,53 Waldron encouraged Zapata to continue searching for
someone who would drill. Two years later the well was finally drilled
and resulted in a dry hole. Waldron then sued Zapata for breach of the
original farmout agreement. 54 The appeals court found that the trial court
properly submitted the issue of waiver to the jury, which found that the
plaintiff had waived any claim against Zapata for breach of the promise
to drill by the expiration date of the Cockrell farmout agreement.55
Equity may also impose liability, however. Dews v. Halliburton
Industries,Inc., 56 held that a farmee, who had assigned his interest under
the farmout agreement to another who then partially performed by
drilling the earning well, would be unjustly enriched if he were permitted
to claim the benefit of the well drilled by the assignee without being
obligated to pay the charges of the drilling and service companies to
which the assignee had defaulted. "

[31 Contract Interpretation
Though equity clearly has a role, particularly in contract-formation
disputes, the prevailing theme of farmouts cases is that the parties to a
transaction will be restricted to and bound by the explicit terms of their
agreement. Equitable principles generally will not apply to create
obligations that the contract does not address or vary those that it does.

50

Id.

878 S.W.2d 349, 129 O&GR 565 (Tex. App. -Houston [1st District] 1994).
878 S.W.2d at 350.
s3
Apparently the suit was for the cash payment. In Texas and several other states,
however, one cannot recover damages for another's failure to drill without showing that
the well that was not drilled would have been profitable. See Guardian Trust v. Brothers,
59 S.W.2d 343, 345 (Tex. Civ. App. --Eastland 1933, writ ref'd). See also the discussion
at SMU, supra n. 3, at 812-814.
54
878 S.W.2d at 350.
SId.
at 351.
56
708 S.W.2d 67,89 O&GR 455 (Ark. 1986).
5
708 S.W.2d at 69.
51

52
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Phillips Oil Co. v. OKC Corp.," is an example. Aminoil owned
working interests in an offshore lease. When the lease operator proposed
a platform, Aminoil decided to farm out its interest to OKC. Aminoil and
OKC discussed Aminoil retaining an overriding royalty that would be
convertible upon payout of the platform into a net profits interest in the
production from the platform. Aminoil and OKC even exchanged written
communication to that effect. But when Aminoil drew up the farmout
agreement, it contained a reservation of interest in the entire lease.
OKC reviewed the agreement for nearly five weeks and then executed it.
The trial court found that the lease was unambiguous and that Aminoil
had reserved an interest in the entire lease. OKC argued for reformation
under Louisiana law based on mutual mistake of the parties. The Fifth
Circuit Court held that OKC could not show mutual mistake because the
parties were experienced in transactions of this type,o the agreement had
been extensively reviewed, the provision was central to the agreement,
the writing was clear and unambiguous,62 and there was no evidence that
Aminoil shared in the mistake.63
A United States District Court in Kansas applied a similar analysis
in Amoco Production Co. v. Hugoton Energy Corp., 6 a dispute that
arose either because the parties did not understand their complex
agreement or because they did not administer it carefully. Amoco farmed
out to Hugoton ten drilling blocks, each of which included Amoco's
leases in nine sections. 6 The contract provided for Hugoton to earn
assignments of Amoco's leases based on a complex scheme of
Exploratory Test Wells (ETWs) and Development Test Wells (DTWs),

812 F.2d 265,98 O&GR 84 (5th Cir. 1987). Professor Martin commented on this
case in Discussion Notes, 98 O&GR 93.
5
The farmout provided for an overriding royalty of 1/12 of 1/4 of8/8ths of
production until net profits were received. The overriding royalty converted into an
escalating net profits interest. The net profits interest was specified to be 20% of the one
quarter interest until recovery of the first 4,000,000 barrels and 33% thereafter. 812
S.W.2d at 267, n.3. The agreement stated that the overriding royalty and escalating net
profits interest applied to "the lease." Id. at268, n. 4.
60
Id. at 276.
61
Id. at 277. The court stated that the provision "goes to a significant purpose behind
the transaction."
62
Id. at 276. The court held that the agreement was "drafted in clear and simple
terms, such that even a reader with no expertise in oil and gas transactions could find it
comprehensible."
63
Id. at 278. The court found that" the evidence clearly indicates a deliberate decision
on the part of Aminoil, mid-way through the drafting process, to reserve an overriding
royalty interest in production from the subject lease as distinguished from an interest in
production from Platform A."
6
11 F. Supp.2d 1270, _ O&GR _ (D. Kan. 1998).
65
11 F. Supp.2d at 1272.

5

-112

and for Amoco to retain a 5.5 percent overriding royalty in ETWs and
7.5 percent overriding royalty and 20 percent back-in in DTWs.6 6
Hugoton drilled successful gas wells and received appropriate
assignments, which triggered a "drilling clock" that limited Hugoton's
right to continue drilling.67 Hugoton also drilled additional development
wells on the assigned acreage, which did not meet the contract definition
of DTW, but the parties believed at the time that the wells so qualified
and treated them as DTWs. 68 Had the wells qualified as DTWs, Amoco
would have been entitled to a convertible 7.5 percent overriding royalty.
If they did not, Amoco retained only a nonconvertible 5.5 percent
overriding royalty.69 Amoco contended that the subsequent conduct of
the parties implied an agreement to characterize the two wells as
DTWs. 70 The court, however, could not find the necessary intent to
modify the contract, because the parties were unaware that the contract
needed to be modified. Subsequent conduct would have been helpful to
interpret an ambiguous clause in the contract, the court said, but neither
of the parties asserted that the contract was ambiguous.7 2 Finally, Amoco
argued that the contract drilling clock had expired, if the two wells were
not DTWs, resulting in termination of Hugoton's right to drill additional
wells.7 3 The court found that Amoco's claim amounted to an action for
trespass, which miscarried because Amoco had consented to the wells.7 4
and Amoco failed there due to the court's finding of consent. Amoco in
turn urged that its consent was negated by mistake, but the court applied
the Restatement rule that consent is negated only if the trespasser was
aware that the consenter was mistaken; since both Amoco and Hugoton
believed the wells to be DTW's, Amoco's consent stood.
Puckett v. Oelze,76 also reflects a strict-constructionist approach.
Puckett farmed out a lease covering one-quarter mineral interest in fifty
acres to Oelze with the agreement that Oelze would drill a test well on a
Id. at 1272-1274.
Id. at 1274-1275. The court described the drilling clock as a "use-it-or-lose-it
provision. Id. at 1274. It appears that the provision was what I termed in SMU, supra n.
3, at 775, a "continuous restricted option" designed to avoid or minimize Rev. Rule 77176.
68
Id. at 1275.
66

67

69

Id.

70

Id. at 1278.

71

Id.
Id. at 1279.

72

73

Id.
Id. at 1279-1280.
7
Id. at 1280.
76
481 N.E.2d 867,87 O&GR 288 (Ill. App. 1985). Professor Kramer prepared a
Discussion Note at 87 O&GR 297.
74
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particular ten acres. The farmout also specified that Puckett would assign
one half of his interest in the lease to Oelze if the well was not a dry hole
and Puckett would receive one eighth of the working interest in the well
and the spacing unit on which the well was located. Oelze pooled the
farmed-out ten acres with ten acres from another well and drilled a
successful well. Oelze maintained that Puckett was entitled only to one
half of one eighth working interest, since the spacing unit was 20 acres,
only 10 of which was from Puckett's lease." The court held that the
farmout agreement was clear on its face, however, and awarded Puckett a
one eighth working interest in the well and the 20 acre spacing unit. The
Illinois court stated that "where the terms of the contract are plain and
unambiguous, the intent of the parties must be ascertained solely from
the words of the contract.
In Pasternak v. Lear Petroleum Exploration, Inc.,7 the court

rejected a claim of mutual mistake in upholding a summary judgment
enforcing the right of parties to an operating agreement to an interest in a
well drilled pursuant to a farmout agreement. 80 The farmout agreement
specifically provided that it was subject to the operating agreement, but
the farmee contended that the provision was included by mutual mistake
and asserted in support of its contention that none of its employees had
read the final version of the farmout agreement. 8' The court applied an
Oklahoma statute82 limiting reformation for mistake to "mistakes not
caused by the neglect of a legal duty on the part of the person making the
mistake," concluding that "the mistake alleged ... was caused solely by

the failure of [the farmee's] representatives to read the farmout
agreement.
The terms of the farmout agreement may be important in
determining whether equitable compensation may be available. In
Petrocana,Inc. v. Margo, Inc.,84 the farmor sought reimbursement for
the fair market value of geological data that it had furnished the farmee,

Puckett owned 1/4 working interest in one half of the drilling unit acreage. A
"typical" farmout arrangement is that the farmor contributes the lease, the farmee drills
the well, and the farmor and the farmee share the working interest equally after payout.
See SMU, supra n. 3, at 763. By this logic, one would have expected that Puckett would
have been entitled to 1/16 of the working interest in the well. See SMU, supra n. 3, at
765-768.
78
481 N.E.2d at 871.
7
790 F.2d 828,89 O&GR 160 (10th Cir. 1986).
80
790 F.2d at 834.
81
Id. at 834-835.
82
Okla. Stat. Tit. 15, § 63 (1981).
77

8

Id. at 825.

84

577 So.2d 274,276, 115 O&GR 84 (La. App. -3d Cir. 1991).
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which had failed to drill.85 The court rejected the claim noting that it was
"an attempt to state a cause of action to recover damages for defendants'
non-performance of the [option] farmout agreement" inconsistent with
the provision that the "only" penalty for non-performance would be the
forfeit of an advance cash payment and the loss of the right to earn an
interest in the farmed-out leases.86
Generally, however, the strict construction that most courts give
farmout agreements arises from the fact that disputes about farmout
agreements are "just business." Farmout disputes arise out of
complicated and case-specific transactions that the parties choose to
structure. Courts have no particular expertise - and no particular interest
- in reading between the lines of farmout agreements to find the terms
that the parties would have included had they thought their deal through
carefully.
III. Common Farmout Issues
While there is no "model" form farmout contract, farmout
agreements raise some common issues that cases surveyed address. In
this section of the paper, I will address developments relating to these
substantive issues.
[1] Key Characteristics of Farmouts
When I wrote in 1987, I discussed at length key characteristics of
farmout agreements. - (1) the duty imposed: option or obligation, (2)
the earning factor: produce-to-earn or drill-to-earn, (3) the interest
earned: divided or undivided, (4) the number of wells: single or multiplewell farmouts, and (5) the form of the agreement: agreement-to-transfer
or conditional-assignment. 87 A single dispute, which has occupied an
inordinate amount of time of Texas lawyers and Texas courts - resulting
in four appellate decisions in seven years - illustrates the importance
that all of these factors may assume.
In Rogers v. Ricane Enterprises, Inc., 8 commonly referred to as
"Ricane I, " the 'Texas Supreme Court considered a Superior Oil
Company farmout of part of a lease to Western. One paragraph of the
present-assignment farmout agreement conditioned Western's rights
upon commencement of drilling operations, while a second paragraph
required Western to perform all lease obligations:

577 So.2d at 278.
Id. Professor Martin questions this reasoning at Discussion Notes, 115 O&GR 99.
See the discussion of the problems of classifying farmout agreements as "obligation" or
"option" agreements at SMU, supran. 3, at 811.
87
See SMU, supra n. 3, at 792-796.
88
772 S.W.2d 76, 108 O&GR 331 (Tex.1989). Professor Kramer commented on this
case in Discussion Notes, 108 O&GR 340.
8
86
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THIS ASSIGNMENT IS MADE SUBJECT TO THE
FOLLOWING CONDITION AND PROVISION:
1.
All of the right, title, interest and privileges herein conveyed to and
conferred upon Western will cease and terminate and shall revert to
and revest in Superior, unless within thirty (30) days after the date
hereof, Western shall commence the actual drilling for oil and gas
upon the above described land and at a location thereon which shall
satisfy any then existing offset obligation ....
2.
Western shall and hereby does assume and agree to perform and
discharge all of the [base] lease obligations, express or implied ....
To this end, it is recognized by the parties hereto . . . that there now
are a number of . . . off-set wells which Western shall protect

against by the drilling of properly located wells on the above
described land, in due and proper time, and subject to all of the
applicable provisions of this agreement." 89
Western's well produced marginally and then was converted to a
disposal well, but the lease was continued by production elsewhere on
the property. 90 Thereafter, neither the farmee nor anyone acting in its
behalf did anything with the property for nearly 23 years until a
subsequent assignee of the farmor drilled a prolifically-producing well
on the property. 9' The court of appeals interpreted the language of the
assignment as incorporating the terms of the underlying oil and gas
lease, 92 which required either production or continuing operations to be
maintained.93 Thus, "upon Western's complete cessation of the use of the
leased land for the purpose of mineral exploration, development, and
production, the determinable fee it acquired by the assignment
terminated.9 4 The Texas Supreme Court reversed. The Supreme Court
8
90

772 S.W.2d at 78.
id

Rogers v. Ricane Enterprises, Inc., 775 S.W.2d 391,395, 108 O&GR 322
(Tex.App. Amarillo 1987), reversed 772 S.W.2d 76, 108 O&GR 331 (Tex. 1989). In fact,
Western's corporate charter was canceled in 1965, and the person charged by the
shareholders with the responsibility of settling the affairs of Western, testified that it was
his intent to pay the Internal Revenue Service and "get the hell out of Dodge." Rogers v.
Ricane Enterprises, Inc., 852 S.W.2d 751, 762, 130 O&GR 392 (Tex.App. -Amarillo
1993), reversed 884 S.W.2d 763, 130 O&GR 415 (Tex. 1994).
92
The appeals court said that "a condition of the assignment was that ... Western
assume and perform all obligations, express or implied, required by the underlying Dean
lease. The incorporation of the Dean lease into the assignment made the lease a part of
the assignment and required their concurrent operation ..... 775 S.W.2d at 394.
91

93

Id. at 392.

94

Id. at 395.
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agreed with the court of appeals that the first paragraph of the assignment
made drilling the initial well a condition of earning, which Western had
satisfied. 95 The supreme court reasoned, however, that if the farmee
breached the agreement, it breached its second paragraph, which was a
covenant rather than a condition:
In paragraph 2 of the assignment, Western simply agreed to perform
all the obligations of the base lease, express or implied. Since the
parties obviously knew how to create a condition in paragraph 1, the
dissimilar language in paragraph 2 indicates that the parties intended
the latter paragraph to act as a covenant. We hold that paragraph 2 is
a covenant, not a condition, and that the court of appeals
erroneously read into paragraph 2 a condition on the estate
conveyed. 6
Thus, if the farmor had a claim it was for damages, rather than for lease
termination. The court also reaffirmed Texas law that an oil and gas lease
-

or a lease assignment -

transfers an interest in real property that

cannot be abandoned.
On remand, the trial court jury found for the defendants, on
reasoning that set up another round of appeals. The jury concluded that
the Rogers group, the descendants and assigns of the Western
shareholders, had abandoned the purposes for which the assignment was
made. 98 The court of appeals upheld the jury's take-nothing award on
the basis of an implied special limitation of devotion to purpose
articulated in what it described as the "hoary case, 99 of Texas Co. v.
Davis. 00 Again, however, the Texas Supreme Court reversed, this time
in a 5-4 decision. In Rogers v. Ricane Enterprises, Inc., 101 which is

referred to as "Ricane II," the Texas Supreme Court stated the doctrine
of Davis to be:
Davis stands, therefore, for the proposition of law that, if the
expressed purpose of the lease is the production of minerals, and the
grantee 'entirely and permanently stopped and abandoned the
exploration and development' of the property in question, then the
estate terminates at once and title reverts to the grantor. 102

9
96

772 S.W.2d at 79.

Id.

Id. at 80
852 S.W.2d at 759.
99
Id. at 756.
1oo 254 S.W. 304 (Tex. 1923).
101 884 S.W.2d 763, 130 O&GR 415 (Tex. 1994). Professor Kramer commented
in
Discussion Notes, 130 O&GR 429.
102
Id. at 766, citing 254 S.W. at 309.
9

98
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The court then essentially limited Davis to its facts by refusing to
imply a drilling purpose in the farmout assignment. Quoting Ricane I, the
court said that "the language used by the parties .03...will not be held to
impose a special limitation on the grant unless it is clear and precise and
so unequivocal that it can be given no other meaning.104 Further, the
court concluded that even were it to imply a drilling purpose in the
assignment, the proper remedy for the breach of an implied covenant in a
lease is an action for breach of that implied covenant, or a conditional
decree of cancellation allowing the parties to fulfill the covenant, and not
cancellation of the lease.' 05
The Ricane cases are important and interesting. First, the cases are
great instructional tools, because the facts underlying Ricane I and
Ricane II illustrate several of the distinctions that I made in my SMU
paper. The Ricane farmout is a classic illustration of a drill-to-earn,
divided interest, single-well conditional-assignmentfarmout agreement.
It was a drill-to-earn, divided-interest and single-well farmout because

Western obtained its rights in a separate part of a larger lease by drilling
a well, not by completing a well capable of producing in paying
quantities.'0 6 And Western obtained a conditional assignment of its
interest before it performed, rather than an assignment after it had drilled
the earning well. Second, Ricane I underscores the distinction between
conditions and covenants in farmout agreements. As the Texas Supreme
Court held, the farmout agreement made additional operations a promise,
rather than a condition of Western's continued ownership. Third, the
Ricane cases make absolutely clear that a mineral or leasehold interest in
Texas is an estate in land that may not be terminated by abandonment,
but they leave Texas without a common law doctrine to clear old clouded
titles.107 Finally, Ricane II teaches that farmout agreements should
contain express provisions to terminate the farmers' earned rights, if the
Id. at 767. The Davis lease contained a specific statement that the conveyance was
made for "the purpose of drilling, mining, and operating for minerals." 254 S.W. at 305.
10
884 S.W.2d at 767, citing 772 S.W.2d at 79.
103

105

884 S.W.2d at 767-768.

Apparently, however, the well Western drilled was capable of producing in paying
quantities though it produced only marginally, because it was drilled in 1949 and not
converted to a disposal well until 1961. 775 S.W.2d at 392.
107
The issue of what ought to be the law - whether the fee simple determinable estate
created by a lease or farmout agreement ought to be subject to an implied limitation of
devotion to purpose - excited a great deal of attention. I assisted some members of the
Ricane group in preparing their briefs supporting the existence of an implied limitation.
Professors Howard Williams and Joseph Shade also filed amicus curiae briefs in support
of the Ricane group position. Professor Edwin Homer filed an amicus curiae brief against
it. Approximately two dozen practicing lawyers filed amicus curiae briefs, either on
behalf of clients or for themselves. After the decision, Professor Bruce Kramer suggested
106

that the problem of how to clear titles should be left to the legislature. See Discussion
Notes, 130 O&GR 429, 431-432.
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parties intend that they may terminate before the underlying leases
end. 108
[21 The Form of the Agreement: Agreement-to-Transfer or
Conditional Assignment
Farmout agreements traditionally have taken the form either of an
agreement to transfer or a conditional assignment. The essential

difference in the two is the point in time when the farmee acquires an
interest in the farmed-out property. Under an agreement-to-transfer form,
the farmee obtains its rights only when (and if) it performs the conditions
of the contract,108 '09 Under a conditional-assignment farmout, the
farmee obtains an interest in the farmed-out property when the agreement
is made, subject to an obligation to reconvey or to automatic termination
if the conditions subsequent are not performed.o
The farmout's form may have enormous practical significance to the
parties' rights and liabilities. Farmors generally prefer an agreement-totransfer form, because that structure permits a farmor to retain title until
the farmee performs. Farmees generally prefer conditional assignments,
because they get title immediately."'
Recent cases tend to confirm the general preferences of farmors and
farmees. Farmors have somewhat more protection against liens with an
agreement-to-transfer farmout structure than with a conditionalassignment structure because the farmee has no present right to the
property at the time the work is done, which may prevent a lien from
attaching. Several of the recent cases involved assertion of mechanics
liens and the technicalities of the various states' lien statutes. In Noble
Exploration, Inc. v. Nixon Drilling Co., Inc.,

112

a Texas Court of

As alternative, the assignment might provide that it is given for "the purpose of
drilling, mining, and operating for minerals," to incorporate the implied special limitation
of devotion to purpose of Texas Co. v. Davis.
109
The terminology is not important. What I call an "agreement-to-transfer farmout" is
often described as an "agreement-to-convey" form, and what I call a "conditionalassignment" farmout is often called a "term assignment" in the industry. I shall, however,
try to be consistent.
1os

See, e.g., Vickers v. Peaker, 227 Ark. 587, 300 S.W.2d 29,31-34, 7 O&GR 1177
(1957) (automatic termination) (the subject of comment by Professor Masterson at
Discussion Notes, 7 O&GR 1183; Mengden v. Peninsula Prod. Co., 544 S.W.2d 643,64749,55 O&GR 477 (Tex. 1976) (obligation to reassign). Some writers apparently do not
consider conditional assignments to be true farmout agreements. See, e.g., Steven C.
Haworth, "Farmouts and Term Assignments -Anatomy 101," Paper 6, 39th Ann. Inst. For
Prof. Landmen (Southwestern Lgl. Fnd. 1998).
I" See generally the discussion at SMU, supra n. 3, at 796. These practical
considerations may be overridden by the tax advantages of the conditional-assignment
farmout in situations in which the farmout agreement covers "outside" acreage. See
generally SMU, supra n. 3, at 773-775.
110

2 794 S.W.2d 589, 114 O&GR 160 (Tex.App. --Austin 1990). The writer commented in
Discussion Notes, 114 O&GR 168.
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Appeals held that a drilling contractor hired by a farmee under an
agreement-to-transfer farmout was not entitled to a mechanics lien
against the farmor's leasehold interest in the absence of proof of an
express or implied contract between the drilling contractor and the
farmor or its agent. '13 Amoco Production Company v. Horwell Energy,

Inc., 114 reaches that result under Louisiana law."t5 There, the Fifth
Circuit Court of Appeals held that a contractor hired by a farmee to drill
the earning well in return for an interest in the well was not entitled to a
mechanics lien against the farmor's property under Louisiana law
because the interest that the drilling contractor was due did not constitute
an "amount due" under the lien statute.l 16 In Dews v. Halliburton
Industries, Inc., 117 the Arkansas Supreme Court reversed a trial court's

imposition of statutory liens against both the farmor and farmee because
of inadequate notice. 118 It also released equitable liens the trial court had
imposed upon all the funds held by the production purchaser because "at

"
The keys to this decision are (1) the terms of the statute and (2) the court's finding
that the farmout agreement was not properly placed in evidence. The Texas lien statute, §
56.001(2), limits liens against mineral properties to those who meet the definition of
"mineral contractor," a person who renders services or provide materials "under an
express or implied contract with a mineral property owner or with a trustee, agent, or
receiver of a mineral property owner." The court reasoned that, because the farmout
agreement had not bee introduced at trial, it could not considered in the appeal even
though it had been attached to the plaintiffs pleadings. Moreover, the fact that the written
farmout agreement existed, precluded a finding of an implied contract. 794 S.W.2d at
592. Texas courts do not appear to have decided squarely whether a farmout agreement
establishes the farmee as an agent of the farmor for purposes of the lien statute, and the
court's evidentiary ruling avoided that issue in this case. Logic suggests that the validity
of liens asserted by contractors against a farmor should be determined by the precise
terms of the farmout agreement and the factual circumstances. For example, it would be
easier to describe a farmee as the agent of a farmor for lien purposes if the farmout
agreement made drilling an obligation of the farmee, rather than an option. In the most
common situation, however, where the farmout agreement makes drilling an option of the
farmee, the scope of a contractor's lien will probably be limited to whatever interest the
farmee earns.
114
969 F.2d 146, 120 O&GR 500 (5th Cir. 1992).
11
Amoco's farmout to Horwell Energy provided that, if the well was completed as a
producer, and Horwell complied with certain other terms of the agreement, Amoco would
assign Horwell an 80% interest in the well. In turn, Horwell contracted with Gardes
Directional Drilling to drill and complete the well. Horwell agreed to assign Gardes part
of the interest it was to earn from Amoco. Gardes drilled, but Horwell breached its
agreement with Amoco, which elected to terminate the farmout, so Horwell could not
perform its promise to assign. Thereafter, Gardes filed a lien against Amoco. 969 F.2d at
147.
116
Id. at 148, citing LSA-R.S. 9:4861(A).
"1 708 S.W.2d 67,89 O&GR 455 (Ark. 1986).
118
708 S.W.2d at 70.
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the time the work was performed

. . .,

[the farmee] did not have an

9

interest in production."
Other recent cases are likely to confirm farmees' preference for the
conditional-assignment form of farmout. In Moncrief v. The Louisiana
Land & Exploration Co., 120 the Wyoming Supreme Court concluded that
a farmee had no right to vote the interests covered by an agreement-totransfer farmout in a consent/nonconsent election under a unit operating
agreement. The court reasoned that acreage must be counted as
consenting or non-consenting at the expiration of the election period, at
which time the farmee did not have a binding agreement.1 21 The court
rejected the argument that the time at which the farmee had to control the
farmor's interest was the spudding of the well and that the doctrine of
equitable conversion operated to vest the farmee with the farmor's rights
at that moment.12 2 In Beavers v. Kaiser,12 3 however, the North Dakota
Supreme Court held that a farmee that had performed its option to drill
and complete a well under an agreement-to-assign farmout acquired
equitable rights that related back to the date the farmout was given.' 24
A case decided since I wrote in 1987, however, underscores how
important it is that the conditional assignment be properly structured. In
Riley v. Merriwether,12 5 lease farmors sought a declaratory judgment that
an assigned interest had terminated. The conditional assignment provided
that it would terminate either if a new well was not commenced within
ninety days after the cessation of the drilling program or if there was no
gas production within sixty days after the last well was completed. There
was no production from or operations on the property for thirteen
months. The assignment did not provide for shut-in royalty payments,
though the leases subject to the assignment contained shut-in royalty
clauses and shut-in royalties had been tendered to the lessors. A jury
found that the assignors had waived their rights to complain. The trial
court set aside the jury's finding of waiver and held that the assignee's

119

Id

861 P.2d 516, 127 O&GR 406 (Wyo. 1993). Professor Gereau criticized the case in
Discussion Notes, 127 O&GR 433.
121
861 P.2d at 527-528.
122
Id. at 525-526. The opinion is lengthy, the facts are complicated, and the reasoning
of the court is hazy. The case is the subject of a comment in Owen L. Anderson, "Recent
Developments in Nonregulatory Oil and Gas Law," 45 OIL & GAS INST. Ch. 1 (1994).
123
537 N.W.2d 653, 134 0&GR 239 (N.D. 1995).
124
537 N.W.2d at 656-657. The case is the subject of a Discussion Note by Professor
Anderson at 134 O&GR 248.
125
780 S.W.2d 919, 111 O&GR 336 (Tex. App. -El Paso 1989, writ denied). The
writer commented upon this case at Discussion Notes, 111 O&GR 348, and this text is
based upon that comment.
120

-
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estate had terminated under the terms of the assignment.' 26 On appeal,
the court rejected the assignees' argument that a clause in the assignment
that "reference[ d] for all purposes ... the oil and gas leases described in

Exhibit A attached hereto and incorporated herein by this reference"
incorporated the underlying leases -and their shut-in royalty clauses in the assignment. The court of appeals concluded that the quoted
language merely referenced the exhibit as a description of the leases.127
Thus, the court of appeals reasoned, the assignment created a fee simple
determinable in the assignee that had terminated automatically as a
matter of law when production ceased and the grace periods provided in
the assignment ran.128 The assignees could not "bootstrap" the lease shutin royalty and notice clauses,129 and waiver did not apply because the
assignment had terminated as a matter of law.130
The law applied by the court is well-established in Texas, as well as
in many other states. The assignment provided for a term for as long as
"oil or gas . .. are produced ... ." It conveyed a fee simple determinable
interest that terminated when there was no "production," either actual or
constructive. By definition, in Texas, a shut-in well is not "producing,"
and the assignment contained no shut-in clause or notice-and-demand
clause to provide constructive production. If the estate created by the
assignment is to be held by constructive production, the assignment must
contain a complete set of provisions for constructive production. '31
[31 Failure of Title

Farmout agreements customarily impose the risk of title failure
upon the farmee. 132 Only rarely does a farmout agreement warrant the
farmor's title. A recent New Mexico case makes representations nearly
the equivalent of warranties, however, in some circumstances. In Strata
Production Co. v. Mercury Exploration Co.,

133

Mercury represented in a

farmout agreement, but did not warrant, that it owned or controlled 100%
780 S.W.2d at 921.
Id at 924. The court's interpretation of the clause in the corrected assignment that
the assignment "reference[d] for all purposes ... the oil and gas leases described in
Exhibit A attached hereto and incorporated herein by this reference" is hard to follow, but
I believe that it is technically correct. It is a general rule of grammar that a restricting
clause qualifies only its nearest antecedent; thus, the phrase "incorporated herein by this
reference" modifies "Exhibit A," not "the oil and gas leases described in Exhibit A."
128
Id at 923.
126
127

129

Id. at 924-925.

Id at 923.
See also Archer County v. Webb, 161 Tex. 210, 338 S.W. 2d 435, 13 O&GR 280
(1960) (commented upon by Professor Maxwell in discussion Notes, 13 O&GR 291) and
the commentary at 1 EUGENE 0. KUNTZ,THE LAW OF OIL & GAS § 15.8 (1987).
132
See the discussion at SMU, supra n. 3, at 798.
'3
916 P.2d 822, 133 O&GR 85 (N.M.1996).
130

131

- 122

-

of the working interest in the farmed-out acreage.13 4 In fact, Mercury
owned less than 100%, and Strata sued Mercury for the value of the
difference. Because Strata had paid no independent consideration for the
farmout and because Strata had learned of the problem before it
commenced performance, Mercury argued that Strata had waived the
representation. 135 The New Mexico Supreme Court characterized the
farmout agreement as an offer for a unilateral contract running from the
farmor to the farmee, to be accepted by commencement of performance,
but held that the agreement had become binding by virtue of promissory
estoppel even before Strata commenced drilling. Promissory estoppel
arose, the court held, from the fact that Strata had drilled the first well on
the prospect in reliance upon Mercury's representation, though that well
was not located on the farmed-out acreage.' 36 The court also rejected
Mercury's assertion that it had no liability because it had only agreed to
"assign to Strata 100% of Mercury's interest." 13 Because New Mexico
has rejected the strict, "four-comers approach to contract interpretation
and instead has allowed courts to consider extrinsic evidence concerning
the circumstances surrounding the execution of the agreement to
determine if contract terms are in fact ambiguous,"' 3 8 the court looked to
deposition and trial testimony to conclude that there was substantial
evidence that Mercury had in fact promised to assign 100% of the
working interest to Strata. 139
141 Well "Commencement"
Farmout agreement commencement-of-drilling provisions vary
widely.14 0 In their dealings with one another, however, people in the oil
and gas business are likely to seek more precision than is offered by oil
and gas lease language that commonly requires mere "commencement of
operations" or "commencement of drilling" - terms that are generally
given very liberal interpretation by the Courts.141 In farmout agreements,
916 P.2d at 825.
Id. at 826.
136
Id. at 828-829. Further, the court held that promissory estoppel applied even though
Strata's reliance was not detrimental, since the first well was a very good well. Id at 829.
13
Id. at 830.
13
See id, citing C.R. Anthony Co. v. Loretto Mall Partners, 817 P.2d 238,242-43
(N.M. 1991) and Mark V, Inc. v. Mellekas, 845 P.2d 1232, 1235-36 (N.M. 1993).
'"
916 P.2d at 831. The court also held that though the farmee had sold most of its
interest in the prospect to investors who were not parties to the action, the farmee was
entitled to 100% of the damages because the farmout was between Mercury and Strata
and there was no privity of contract between the investors and Mercury. Id at 831-832.
Further, the court appeared to adopt the "lost royalty" rule as the measure of damages for
breach of a drilling contract. Id. at 832-833. See also the discussion at SMU, supra n. 3,
at 812-814.
140
See the discussion at SMU, supra n. 3, at 802-803.
141
See generally KUNTZ, LOWE, ET AL., supra n. 6, at 176-180.
134
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the requirement more frequently is that the farmee "commence the actual
drilling" of a well or that a well be "spudded." Both terms are commonly
understood to be intended to require that a drill bit have pierced the
ground.
A recent federal case from Mississippi illustrates how important
word variation may be in drafting commencement provisions in farmout
agreements. In Exxon Corporation. v. Crosby Mississippi Resources,

Ltd., 142 an exploration agreement continuous-drilling provision allowed
a 180 day gap between completion of an exploratory well and "actual
commencement of drilling" of a development well.143 The Fifth Circuit
Court upheld a lower court's ruling that the contract term was ambiguous
and that drilling "actually commenced" when a small truck-mounted
drilling rig began drilling for the installation of conductor pipe.'" The
court reasoned that "creation of the conductor pipe hole was part and
parcel of the actual drilling process, and was more than preparatory
activity, such as the gathering of equipment or the clearing of land." 145
Neomar Resources, Inc. v. Amerada Hess Corporation146 also teaches a
drafting lesson, one particularly important in farmouts of property upon
which wells have been drilled previously. There, the court held that a
farmee could not maintain a claim against the farmor and its assignee for
failing to permit the farmee to use a nonproducing hole drilled to a
deeper formation, which caused the farmee to have to spend millions of
dollars to drill a twin well. The court noted that the farmout agreement
did not give the farmee an express right to use the borehole. 147 It rejected
142

143

154 F.3d 202 (5th Cir. 1998).
Id. at 206, n. 8.

Id. at 207. Conductor pipe is installed to prevent the borehole from caving in under
the weight of the drilling rig. After its installation, the remaining drilling work is
performed through the conductor pipe.
145
Id. at 208. The court also refers, apparently with approval, to the district court's
conclusion that if the parties had meant that only the use of a larger drilling rig would
satisfy the "commencement of actual drilling" language, they could have used language
to that effect in the contract. Id. at 207. Something like "the term 'drilling operations'
shall mean actual drilling operations with a drilling rig on location adequate to drill to the
permitted depth, together with all attendant equipment, with the drill bit actually turning
in the ground, conducted in good faith, with reasonable diligence, and in a good and
workmanlike manner" might have sufficed.
146
648 So.2d 1066, 132 O&GR 613 (La. - 1st Cir. 1994).
147
648 So.2d at 1068. While the scope of the implied easement for use of the surface
should extend to the use of abandoned well bores on the farmed-out property, this case
suggests that the farmout agreement should grant that right expressly if the farmee
anticipates re-entering an abandoned well. For discussion of the implied easement, see
generally, John S. Lowe, "The Easement of the Mineral Estate for Surface Use: An
Analysis of Its Rationale, Status and Prospects," 39th ROCKY MTN. MIN. L. INST. Ch.
4 (1993) and John S. Lowe, "The Lessee's Right to Free Use of Produced Substances:
New Wine in Old Bottles," 37 NAT. RES. J. 729 (1997).
144

124-

the argument that the reasonable prudent operator standard implied the
duty, because that duty runs from a lessee to a lessor, not to the lessee's
assignee. The court also rejected the argument that the refusal violated
public policy against waste and inefficiency, noting that, if such a cause
of action existed the right would lie with the state, not the farmee .148
Finally -and this is the most important drafting point made by the case the court stated that it did not accept the farmee's argument that a lessee
or farmee was always entitled to use improvements on the land. 149

[5] Objective Depth
The "objective depth," or the "contract depth" as it is sometimes
called, is, the depth that the farmee must drill under the terms of the
farmout agreement in order to earn its interest under the farmout
agreement. Objective depth usually is described either by reference to the
number of feet to be drilled or by description of the formation to be
explored. Either may cause interpretive difficulties.150
The meaning of "objective depth" was at issue in Arleth v.
Freeport-McMoran Oil & Gas Co.1'5 Freeport drilled a well to the
15,900' sand, allegedly discovered what the court described as the
"Mother Lode," but could not complete because of mechanical problems.
152 Subsequently, Freeport agreed with the Arleth groupl52 '
to drill an
additional well and "in the event that . .. the well . . . is not completed as

a commercial producer . .. after reaching the well's objective depth in a
straight hole configuration, then. .. [Freeport] shall attempt to sidetrack
the well ... to ... [the 15,900' sand.]."153 154 Freeport drilled to within
100 feet of the 15,900' sand, but refused to sidetrack the well because the
well was a commercial producer at the shallower depth. Later, Freeport
drilled its own offset well to the deeper sand and obtained prolific
production.155 The investors sued, and a federal district court found
Freeport liable for more than $9 million for securities fraud, breach of
contract, and breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair
dealing.156 On appeal, Freeport argued that the letter agreement was
ambiguous and that its reference to the well's "objective depth" meant
148

648 So.2d at 1068.

149

Id at 1069.

1so

For further discussion, see SMU, supra n. 3, at 805-808.
2 F.3d 630, 128 O&GR 62 (5th Cir. 1993), reh'g denied, 9 F.3d 105 (5th Cir.

1s1

1993).
2 F.3d at 632.
Arleth is not, strictly speaking, a farmout case. The letter agreement arose out of a
corporate merger. Id. at 631.
114
Id at 633.
15
Ida
156
Id at 632.
152
153
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the measured depths that would permit production from any of the three
formations in which commercial production had been encountered. The
Fifth Circuit rejected this argument, holding that the agreement
unambiguously obligated Freeport to drill "two alternative
configurations" to the 15,900' sand. 5 7
Without the full text of the letter agreement, one cannot evaluate the
debate that took place in Arleth over whether the term "objective depth"
was ambiguous. Clearly, however, the language could have been better
structured. Clearly, as well, the dispute might have been avoided by wellchosen prefatory statements of purpose. 58
[61 Nonoperating Interests Reserved
Farmor's usually reserve a non-operating interest in production
from the earning well or wells during the payout period. Usually, the
interest reserved is in the form of an overriding royalty interest.' A
recurring problem is what duty, if any, the farmee owes to the farmor to
protect the non-operating interest. Specific issues include the "washout
problem," whether the overriding royalty or production payment owner
is protected if the lease upon which the non-operating interest is based is
permitted to terminate, after which the property is re-leased by the
operating rights owner.
[a] The "Washout" Problem
The "washout" problem arises whether the lease transfer is pursuant
to a farmout agreement or a "straight" assignment, though this discussion
will be limited to those cases involving farmout agreements.6 o If the
transferee permits the lease to terminate and then subsequently re-leases
the property, should the original lessee's non-operating interest be
recognized under the new lease? Not affording the original lessee such
protection tempts assignees to wash out non-operating interests to
increase the assignees' profits. But it is basic oil and gas law that an
overriding royalty interest is limited in duration to the life of the
leasehold interest, because the overriding royalty is carved out of the
leasehold interest. By definition, then, termination of the leasehold
interest extinguishes the overriding royalty. In addition, there may be
sound business reasons for an assignee to permit a lease to terminate and
then re-lease the property. In most states, the implied protections against
washout are limited to non-existent. 161
1s7

Id. at 634.

See the discussion at SMU, supra n. 3, at 790.
Id. at 829-832.
160
The broader issue might well be the subject of a separate paper at one of these
institutes.
161
See Bruce A. Ney, Note, "Protecting Overriding Royalty Interests in Oil and Gas
Leases: Are the Courts Moving to Washout Extension or Renewal Clauses?," 31
158
1'
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In Matter of GHR Energy Corp.,

162

the Fifth Circuit applied Texas

law to deny protection to an overriding royalty owner. Medallion Oil
Company acquired overriding royalty interests in property farmed out by
El Paso Natural Gas Company to TransAmerican Natural Gas
Corporation, as a finders fee. Subsequently, TransAmerican settled a gas
contract take-or-pay judgment against El Paso by terminating all
agreements between the companies and accepting an assignment of El
Paso's mineral interest.'63 Medallion contended that its overriding
royalties were still valid, but the court rejected its claims, relying upon
prevailing Texas law '64 and upon language in TransAmerican's
assignment to Medallion that specifically allowed TransAmerican to
terminate its lease interests at will. 165 The court noted in dicta, however,
that "it might well reach a different result if the facts here had suggested
that TransAmerican surrendered its interest in the lease to destroy the
rights of the overriding royalty interest owner.' 66
Marathon Oil Co. v. Moye,'67 applied similar principles to a royalty
interest in a Colombian coal license. The licensee assigned the license to
Marathon in return for cash and an overriding royalty interest.'68 When
the Colombian government nationalized the coal industry, Marathon
relinquished the licenses.' 69 The royalty owner contended that Marathon
owed it a fiduciary obligation to protect its interests. 170 A Texas court of
appeals held that no fiduciary duty was created by the license assignment
and the reservation of the royalty interest.17o 1'
A federal court upheld an arbitration award that protected a farmor
against washout, however, in In the Matter of the Arbitration Between
Asamera Ltd. and Tesoro Petroleum Corp.,172 Asamera's predecessor
WASHBURN L.J. 544 (1992).
162
972 F.2d 96 (5th Cir. 1992), rehearing den'd 979 F.2d 40 (5th Cir. 1992), cert.
denied, 507 U.S. 1042, 113 S.Ct. 1879, 123 L.Ed.2d 497 (1993). The writer was one of
the attorneys for TransAmerican in the appeal to the Fifth Circuit.
163
972 F.2d. at 98.
'6

Id. at 99.

165

Id.

166

Id. at 101.
893 S.W.2d 585, 130 O&GR 645, (Tex.App. -Dallas 1994). The writer commented
on the case in Discussion Notes, 130 O&GR 657.
168
893 S.W.2d at 588. The court describes the interest as a "nonparticipating royalty."
In the oil and gas industry, an interest of this kind would ordinarily be called an
overriding royalty, even though it was carved out of a contractual license for a term of
years, rather than out of an estate in land.
169
Id.
170
Id. at 592.
167

1'
172

Id.
807 F.Supp. 1165 (S.D.N.Y. 1992).
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entered into a Technical Assistance Contract with the Indonesian stateowned oil company, Pertamina, in 1968. The TAC was limited to twenty
years but contained a statement that a request for extension would be
given "sympathetic consideration" by Pertamina. Pursuant to a farmout
agreement that stated it would be governed by Texas law, Asamera
assigned two areas covered by the TAC to Tesoro and retained an
overriding royalty. In 1989, after the 1968 TAC had terminated, Tesoro
entered into its own TAC with Pertamina covering the farmout areas,
retroactive to the date the 1968 TAC expired. Tesoro then stopped
paying Asamera the overriding royalty and Asamera maintained that the
royalty continued under the new TAC. In an American Arbitration
Association proceeding, the arbitrators agreed with Asamera. 173
Tesoro argued that since the overriding royalty was carved out of
the 1968 TAC, it must terminate when the TAC terminated - that
Asamera could acquire "no greater estate" than the 1968 TAC created. 174
The arbitrators, however, reasoned that the TAC was a contract to
produce oil and gas, not a lease governed by Texas property law, so that
the "no greater estate" principle did not apply.'7 5 The 1988 TAC was
therefore subject to Asamera's overriding royalty even though the
farmout of the 1968 TAC did not contain the explicit language that
would have been necessary to attain this result under Texas property law.
The district court confirmed the arbitration award on the grounds that the
arbitrators had not manifestly disregarded Texas law. 76
[b] Extension and Renewal Provisions
As a result of the uncertainty whether a lessee who transfers
operating rights in a lease will by protected against a washout and when
such protection will be extended, lease assignments reserving nonoperating interests frequently contain extension and renewal provisions
guaranteeing recognition of the transferor's non-operating interest in
lease extensions and renewals. 77 In GHR Energy Corp., the extension
173

Id. at 1166.

Id. at 1167. The writer testified for Tesoro in the arbitration as an expert on Texas
oil and gas law.
174

17s

Id. at 1168.

116

Id. at 1169.
An example of an extension and renewal clause follows:

177

This [reservation, grant, conveyance, etc.] shall apply as well to all modifications,
extensions and renewals of the supporting lease, or any part thereof, by the lessee,
his successors and assigns, or any sublessee, his successors and assigns.
"Renewals" shall include wholly new leases made by any of these persons within
[30, 60, 90, etc.] days after the lapse of current lease coverage. The terms of this
paragraph shall be contractually operative as a part of all modification, extension
and renewal leases as well as the current lease. If subject to the Rule against
Perpetuities, this effect shall be treated as wholly lapsed and without effect
commencing one day before the maximum interval permitted by the Rule."
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and renewal provision simply was not broad enough. It stated that the
overriding royalty "shall also apply, extend to and include each and
every renewal or extension of an oil and gas lease covered by this
Assignment which is acquired by [TransAmerican], directly or indirectly,
prior to or within one (1) year of the expiration or termination of said oil
and gas lease." 178 In the event that led to the dispute, TransAmerican
terminated the underlying lease and acquired the mineral estate.
Incomplete or imprecise drafting often leads to problems. The root of the
problem, of course, is conceptual. If an oil and gas lease is regarded as a
conveyance of an interest in real property, as it is in most states, then it is
not possible either to extend or renew it. The issue then becomes when a
new grant is closely enough related to the initial conveyance that the
parties would have regarded it as an "extension or renewal." And that, of
course, is usually determined by the language of the clause.
Robinson v. North American Royalties, Inc. 179 illustrates another
common problem with an extension and renewal clause in the context of
a farmout agreement -the problem of privity. Robinson assigned a lease
to North American Royalties with a reservation of an overriding royalty.
The assignment contained an extension and renewal clause that provided
that the overriding royalty would also apply to any future lease acquired
by North American, its successors or assigns, that covered any portion of
the same property if it was acquired within one year of the expiration of
the present lease. 180 North American in turn entered a farmout agreement
with Stone Oil Corp. Stone drilled a successful well and North American
assigned that portion of the lease containing the producing well, subject
to Robinson's overriding royalty. Stone next drilled a dry hole outside of
the assigned area and then allowed the remainder of the lease to expire.
Soon after the lease expired, Stone entered a new lease with the
lessors.18' Robinson argued that the anti-washout clause applied to the
new lease and was therefore subject to his overriding royalty interest.
The Louisiana Court of Appeals held that Stone was not contractually

JOHN S. LOWE, 7 WEST'S TEXAS FORMS § 11.11 (3d ed. West 1997). Statutes, as
well as the common law or the agreement of the parties, may offer a farmor protection. In
Columbia Natural Resources v. Tatum, 58 F.3d 1101, _ O&GR _ (6th Cir. 1995) a United
States Court of Appeals held that allegations that the defendants allowed or caused
Columbia's farmed-out leases to terminate so that defendants could enter into new oil and
gas leases with the lessors constituted a claim that Columbia might pursue under the
Racketeering Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO).
17
972 F.2d at 99 (emphasis added).
17
463 So.2d 1384, 84 O&GR 281 (La. App. 1985),509 So.2d 679, 95 O&GR 292
(La. 1987). Professor Martin commented on these decisions in Discussion Notes, 84
O&GR 292 and 95 O&GR 304.
Iso 463 So.2d at 1385.
181

Id.

-

129

-

bound under the Mineral Codel 82 unless it drilled a successful well and
received an assignment. There was privity of contract between Stone and
Robinson only for that portion of the lease that Stone was actually
assigned. 8 1
The root of these problems, of course, is conceptual. If an oil and
gas lease is regarded as a conveyance of an interest in real property, as it
is in most states, then it is not possible either to extend or renew it. The
issue then becomes when a new grant is closely enough related to the
initial conveyance that the parties would have regarded it as an
"extension or renewal." And that, of course, is usually determined by the
language of the clause. Incomplete or imprecise drafting often adds to the
difficulties.
[c] Reassignment Clauses
An alternative protection for a nonoperating interest owner is to
obligate the transferee to offer to reassign the lease before permitting the
lease to terminate. Typically, such a provision is referred to as a
reassignment clause.184 Reassignment clauses too may present
enforcement problems because of drafting inadequacies.
Eland Energy, Inc. v. Rowden Oil & Gas, Inc. 185 illustrates the

point, though the drafter was vindicated. In Eland, the farmor and the
farmee executed a farmout agreement that stipulated that the farmor
would assign the farmee 40 acres in the form of a square as nearly as
possible around each producing well the farmee completed. The
agreement also provided that it was binding on all parties and their heirs,
successors and assigns, but not assignable without the farmee's written
consent. Subsequently, the farmor assigned the entire property to the
farmee, subject to the terms of the original farmout agreement, to avoid
the burden of numerous assignments of individual 40 acre tracts. In turn,
The court interprets Article 128 of the Mineral Code as legislatively overruling the
sublease/assignment distinction and imposing a statutory privity of contract between a
sublessor and a sublessee and the sublessee's assignee. Id.
183
Id. at 1388.
184 An example of a reassignment clause
follows:
182

In the event that Assignee should elect to surrender, let expire or terminate,
abandon or release any of his rights in said lease acreage, or any part thereof,
assignee shall notify Assignor not less than thirty (30) days in advance of such
surrender, expiration or termination, abandonment or release and, if requested to do
so by Assignor, the Assignee shall immediately reassign such rights in said lease
acreage, or such part thereof, to Assignor. Such reassignment shall be free and clear
of all lease burdens, overrides and payments out of production in excess of or in
addition to those that existed at the date of the original assignment.
JOHN S. LOWE, 7 WEST'S TEXAS FORMS § 11.12 (3d ed. West 1997).
185 914 S.W.2d 179, _ O&GR _ (Tex. App.--San Antonio 1995). This writer has
commented on the case in Discussion Notes, O&GR _.
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the farmee agreed to continuously develop the lease and to assign back to
the farmor any undeveloped portions when all drilling ceased.186 Several
years later, the farmee assigned undivided interests in the lease to his
children, specifically "subject to any reservations, limitations or burdens
effecting [sic] said leases." 187 Eventually, Eland acquired the interest of
one of the farmor's children. Eland claimed an undivided one-third
interest both in the forty-acre tracts around producing wells and in the
undeveloped acreage of the entire farmout property. The farmor's
successors in interest sought specific performance of the reassignment
provision. The trial court found that Eland had obtained its interest
subject to all of the terms of the farmout, including the reassignment
obligation and granted summary judgment for the farmor's successors.
188 On appeal, Eland raised several reasons why summary judgment was
improper.
Eland claimed that the reassignment claims were barred by the fouryear statute of limitations relating to contracts to convey land. The court
of appeals swept all of Eland's objection aside, however. The court
concluded that because the assignment of the entire lease to the farmee
was made subject to the farmout and the reassignment obligation it
contained, the assignment transferred only legal title. The farmee
obtained equitable title to lease property only by earning it by drilling
wells, and the legal and equitable titles merged when the 40 acre tracts
were designated. 189 The suit was therefore a quiet title action not subject
to any statute of limitations. 190 Eland additionally contended that the
vagueness of the description of the land to be conveyed pursuant to the
farmout caused the statute of frauds to bar any obligation to reassign
unearned acreage; the phraseology was "40 acres in the form of a square
as nearly as possible," and no one knew at the time of the assignment
what portions would be reassigned because no one knew where the wells
would be located. The appellate court concluded that the farmee's right
to designate, coupled with his interest in doing so, satisfied the statute of
frauds. Finally, the court noted that some of the owners of the farmee's
interest had already designated the tracts. 191
186

189

914 S.W.2d at 182.
Id. at 183.
Id at 184.
Id. at 185

o90 Id. at

186.

The Eland analysis is an example of what has been called the "seller's selection
clause exception" to the statute of frauds. James v. NICO Energy Corp., 838 F.2d 1365,
1369, n. 3, 102 O&GR 352 (5th Cir. 1988) (declining to apply the exception to an option
"to participate in subsequent wells on an additional 700 acres (approximately) to be
designated by NICO from acreage which it presently has under lease" (838 F.2d at 1368,
n. 2) as irrelevant to the dispute before it.) Id at 1369, n. 3 (Discussed by the writer in
Discussion Notes, 102 O&GR 368). "[T]he statute of frauds is met where the contract,
191
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Ricane I, 192 discussed at III. [1], above, also illustrates the
difficulty of structuring language in a reassignment clause that will fit the
occasion. There, the farmee corporation did not honor the reassignment
clause, and instead went out of business and dissolved. The successors to
the farmor argued in vain that the farmee's rights had nonetheless
terminated. 1
Indeed, the biggest problem with reassignment clauses may be that
they will be enforced in situations in which the lease assignee or farmee
do not expect them to be.194 In Shore Exploration & ProductionCorp. v.
Exxon Corp., 195 Shore assigned leases to Exxon, Texaco and Eastern

reserving an overriding royalty in separate transactions. The agreements
to assign required the assignees to pay delay rentals or to notify Shore of
its intention not to pay, so that Shore could request reassignment. 196
Subsequently, Texaco acquired the interests of the other assignees and
entered into an agreement with Shore ratifying Shore's overriding
royalty and incorporating the terms of the Exxon and Texaco agreements

instrument or agreement, gives either party the unqualified right or power to make a
selection or determination of the details without the necessity of further agreement or
approval of the other party." Tiller v. Fields, 301 S.W. 2d 185, 190, 7 O&GR 1513 (Tex.
Civ. App.--Texarkana 1957) (commented upon by Professor Masterson in Discussion
Notes, 7 O&GR 1521). The tract from which the selection is to be made must be
described with reasonable certainty, however. Williams v. Ellison, 493 S.W.2d 734, 737
(Tex. 1973).
192
Rogers v. Ricane Enterprises, Inc., 884 S.W.2d 763, 130 O&GR 415 (Tex. 1994).
193
884 S.W.2d at 765.
In "The Reassignment Provision -Meaningful or Not?," 20 ROCKY MTN. MIN. L.
INST.601, 623 (1975), Paul W. Eaton, Jr. aptly described the reassignment clause as "a
vicious, vengeful dog ready to bite the unwary person who ignores it."
976 F.Supp 514, O&GR _ (N.D. Tex. 1997).
'
194

196

The Texaco/Shore reassignment provision provided that;
Should Texaco elect not to pay delay rentals on lease(s) ... in which Shore has only
an overriding royalty interest, Texaco shall first notify any party who owns a
working interest in such lease or leases of its intention to surrender said lease or
leases by non-payment of delay rentals. If the other working interest owner(s) elect
not to pay the delay rental(s), Texaco shall then advise Shore of its intent to release
such lease(s) and Shore shall have the right to make such payment(s) and Texaco
shall assign its interest in said lease(s) to Shore. Texaco shall give Shore thirty (30)
days advance notice of its intention not to make such delay rentals. Shore shall
advise Texaco whether it wishes to make said delay rental payments within fifteen
(15) days of receipt of notice. Failure to timely respond shall be considered an
election by Shore not to make such payment(s). Texaco shall have no liability to
Shore for failure to offer any lease(s) to Shore, provided such failure is not the
result of gross negligence or willful misconduct. Texaco agrees that it will furnish
Shore each month with copies of rental receipts as proof of rental payments being
made on lease(s) during the preceding month.
976 F.Supp. at 524.
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with Eastern to assign, but not the Eastern assignments.197 After drilling
several dry holes, Texaco assigned the leases, covering over 82,000 acres
and subject to Shore's overriding royalty and the reassignment clause, to
Eastern. Eastern neither paid the rentals nor gave the notice required by
the reassignment clause. All of the leases were forfeited for failure to pay
delay rentals.198 Shore then sued Exxon, Texaco and Eastern for
damages. Texaco asked for summary judgment that it was not liable
because it no longer owned an interest in the leases when the failure to
provide notice occurred. The court found Texaco liable on a theory of
privity of contract, for Eastern's failure to give notice regarding the
leases Texaco had acquired directly from Shore and the leases assigned
by Exxon to Texaco, which had been the subject of the Texaco/Shore
ratification.199 The court granted Texaco's motion, however, with respect
to the leases that Texaco had acquired from Eastern and then reassigned
to Eastern, finding that an area of mutual interest agreement between
Texaco and Shore did not establish contractual privity 200 and that, while
the reassignment provision was a covenant running with the land, Texaco
was no longer in privity of estate with Shore.20 1
Probably the simplest way for a farmee to avoid liability after
assignment of lands subject to a prior reassignment obligation is to
provide in the reassignment clause itself that it will be relieved of
liability after an assignment. 202 Merely providing that assignments may
be made only with the farmor's approval (perhaps with the stipulation
that approval would not be unreasonably withheld) does not necessarily
relieve the original promisor of liability on the basis of privity of
contract. 203 Perhaps because it had foreseen the possibility of a situation
such as it confronted, Texaco had included in its reassignment agreement
with Shore a provision that "Texaco shall have no liability to Shore for
19

Id. at 521.

198

Id. at 519-520.

199

Id. at 521-522.

Id. at 522. Shore argued that the AMI clause controlled all subsequent leasehold
interests acquired by Texaco in the AMI area, including the Eastern leases when they
were assigned to Texaco. The court disagreed, reading the contract provision as not being
"intended to apply to every lease into which Shore and Texaco thereafter entered." Id.
201
Id. at 524.
202
Something like "provided, however, that in the event of assignment of this property
in whole or in part, liability for the breach of any obligation hereunder shall rest
exclusively upon the owner of this property, or portion hereof, who commits such
breach" - a clause found in many oil and gas leases - should suffice.
203
Texaco made a similar argument in the Shore case, urging that Shore's consent to
Texaco's release of certain leases indicated its agreement to release Texaco from the
reassignment obligations relating to the retained leases. The court noted the general rule
that an "obligor remains liable for performance of a contractual obligation even after an
assignment." 976 F.Supp. at 525.
200
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failure to offer any lease(s) to Shore, provided such failure is not the
result of gross negligence or willful misconduct.2 04 That limitation did
not protect Texaco, however, for the court held that neither Texaco's
notices to Shore that the leases were being assigned to Eastern nor
Texaco's request that Eastern "handle" the problem of lease default rose
to the level of "slight diligence" or "scant care" necessary to avoid gross
1-205
negligence.
[71 "Payout" Under Farmout Agreements
Farmout agreements almost always provide that the farmee will
"carry" the farmor in drilling operations under the agreement -i.e., that
the farmee will pay all of the expenses of drilling operations. Tax ruleS20 6
and business realities207 require that the farmor postpone sharing any
operating rights in the farmed-out property with the farmee until after
"payout." The period from when the well is drilled and completed until
the farmee has recouped its drilling and development costs, as well as its
operating costs during that period, is generally called the "payout"
period. A typical farmout agreement arrangement gives the farmor a nonoperating interest in production -usually an overriding royalty interest
-until
"payout." After "payout," the farmor's interest may be
convertible at the farmor's option, or convert automatically, to a share of
the working interest 208

204

!d. at 524.

205

Id. at 525-526.

The contributions of property and cash or services by the farmor and farmee
are
treated as a "sharing arrangement," or a pooling of capital, a tax-free transfer to form a
new economic venture, rather than as a sale of property or services. See the discussion at
SMU, supra n. 3, at 765-768.
207
The Fifth Circuit has described a "carried interest" as follows:
206

In any carried interest transaction, one of the owners of the working interest in
property is willing to advance the funds necessary for drilling of wells and
development of production of oil or gas, and to look only to the other owner's share
of production for the other owner's contribution to such costs. The party who puts
up the money is called the carrying party because he risks his entire investment
against the possibility that there will not be enough production to reimburse him for
his costs. The other party is called the carried party because he takes no risks. The
carried party agrees to wait until the carrying party has recouped his drilling and
development costs out of production before he takes any payments on his share.
The carried party is not personally liable for any costs and loses nothing if there is
no production.
United States v. Cocke, 399 F.2d 433, 436 (5th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S.
922 (1969).
208
Typical payout provisions effectively permit the farmee to convert its expenditures
on behalf of the farmor's interest to a nonrecourse loan recoverable out of the farmor's
share of production. RONALD POLEVOI, FEDERAL TAXATION OF OIL AND GAS

TRANSACTIONS § 8.05[3][ c] (Matthew Bender 1987).
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Because "payout" may have great economic importance to both the
farmor and the farmee, it is small wonder that the parties often disagree
about what the term means in particular circumstances.2 09 Several cases
turned up in this survey shed light upon payout issues, though not all of
them arose directly in the context of a farmout agreement.
As I have observed elsewhere, "what specific costs and revenues are
considered in calculating complete payout should be determined by the
directness of their relationship to the asset; costs and revenues that can be
directly related to the earning well should be considered in calculating
payout. 210 The additional cases that I encountered in this survey are
generally consistent with that analysis. In Aminoil USA, Inc. v. OKC
Corporation,2 1 1 the court held that interest and legal fees relating to a
dispute between the farmor and the farmee over the extent of the
farmor's retained ownership interests could not properly be charged in
determining "payout" under a farmout agreement. The court observed
that the agreement did not provide for interest on the farmee's costs,212
nor was it permitted by generally accepted accounting principles.213 The
court held also that the farmout agreement's reference to legal costs to be
charged to the net profits account did not include costs related to disputes
between the parties, such as the one before it.2 14 An analogous analysis is
provided by Krafve v. O'Keeffe, 215 where a court applied a common-

sense interpretation of a poorly-drafted stock-for-working-interest
agreement to hold that "payout" was to be determined by taking into
account only costs incurred in producing revenue from the two mineral
properties farmed out, rather than all general expenses of the operator. 216
In addition, in Burg v. Ruby Drilling Company, Inc., 217 the Wyoming
I wrote at length about this issue at John S. Lowe, "The Meaning of "Payout" in Oil
and Gas Farmout Agreements," supran. 3.
210
Id. at 13-20.
211
629 F.Supp. 647, 90 O&GR 234 (E.D. La. 1986).
212
629 F.Supp. at 650-651.
213
Id. at 651.
214
Id. At 654. The court quoted the testimony of an expert witness that he knew of no
occasion where legal expenses arising from a dispute between the parties to the farmout
agreement had been charged as an operating expense.
215
753 S.W.2d 220, 103 O&GR 633 (Tex.App.--Tyler 1988, writ. denied). Professor
Kramer commented on the case in Discussion Notes, 103 O&GR 647.
216
753 S.W.2d at 222. The contract defined "payout," which was the event that
triggered the shareholder's option to trade corporate stock for producing interests, as the
time "when the amount of production revenue attributable to O'Keeffe's interest shall
equal O'Keeffe's pro rata share of the corporation's- outstanding liabilities as of
November 30, 1981, plus the sum of all ordinary, necessary and reasonable expenses
incurred by the corporation in producing the income during the period ..... Id. at 220.
217
783 P.2d 144, 109 O&GR 360 (Wyo.1989). Professor Gereau commented on the
case at Discussion Notes, 109 O&GR 383.
209
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Supreme Court held that losses incurred by a farmee as a result of a fire
that destroyed some of its equipment could not be recovered as operating
costs under a farmout agreement, when the agreement required the
farmee to obtain insurance and the farmee had failed to do it. 218
The most interesting and problematic additional "payout" case I
encountered is Howell Petroleum Corp. v. Leben Oil Corp.2 19 There, a

farmee obligated by a multiple well farmout agreement to account
quarterly 220 to the farmor went bankrupt, and fifteen years passed before
the farmor's assignee, Howell, realized that it might have valuable rights
and sought an accounting. Howell tried to avoid its obvious problems
with the statute of limitations 221 by arguing alternatively that the farmout
agreement made the accounting obligation either a covenant that
continued as long as any of the wells subject to the farmout agreement
remained in production or a covenant running with the land. The court of
appeals rejected both arguments because of what it described as the
"plain language" of the contract that limited its maximum term to four
years and because neither Howell nor its predecessor had demanded an
accounting after the contract's termination222
One may question the analysis of the Howell court. The farmout
agreement provided merely that it "shall remain in existence for a
maximum period of four (4) years... ,,,223 which de
does not plainly state the
intention of the parties that the accounting obligation end with the
farmout agreement. Indeed, the parties must have known at the time they
drafted the farmout agreement that payout of all the wells drilled might
not have been attained within four years. A more defensible
interpretation of a payout provision was given by the Texas Court of
Appeals in Cummins and Walker Oil Co., Inc. v. Smith.224 There the
court held that the statute of limitations on an agreement to assign a
portion of a working interest after payout began to run only after payout
had occurred, because the facts that constituted the cause of action did
not exist until then. 225
783 P.2d at 153-154.
976 F.2d 614, 121 O&GR 250 (10th Cir. 1992). Professor Kuntz commented on the
case at Discussion Notes, 121 O&GR 264.
220
The accountings were to show the amount expended to date, the amount received to
date and the balance left till payout. 976 F.2d at 614.
221
The trial court applied Oklahoma's five year statute of limitations for written
contracts, Okla. Stat. Tit. 12, § 95, to deny Howell relief. 976 F.2d at 618.
222
976 F.2d at 619.
223
814 S.W.2d 884 (Tex.App. -San Antonio 1991).
224
814 S.W.2d 884 (Tex.App. -San Antonio 1991).
225
Id. at 887. Cummins and Walker does not involve a farmout agreement, but
interprets a compensation agreement for oil company employees. The analysis is
obviously relevant to farmout agreements, however.
218
219
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Another analysis inconsistent with Howell was applied in North
Finn v. Cook 226 There, Cook farmed out portions of a mineral rights
lease to Kelly Oil and Gas Co. The farmout provided that Cook would
assign Kelly the working interest in a 40 acre drill site upon completion
of a well capable of producing in paying quantities. The farmout also
reserved Cook an overriding royalty and provided that "following payout
... , Cook shall be reassigned by Farmee, a fully participating thirty
percent (30%) backing (sic) working interest in the Test Well." 227 Kelly
drilled two wells, one of which was capable of producing in paying
quantities, and Cook assigned a 40 acre location to Kelly. Kelly failed to
pay the costs of drilling the wells and Kelly's property interests were
foreclosed. North Finn purchased the foreclosed property at a sheriffs
sale 228 and contended that Cook's interests were cut off as a personal
covenant between Cook and Kelly. 229 The Wyoming district court
characterized Cook's back-in interest as a possibility of reverter triggered
by "payout" that could not be cut off by a foreclosure sale, despite North
Finn's argument that the interest could not be a possibility of reverter
because it was not automatic -the agreement provided that the farmee
would reassign the interest. 230 The court stated that "the provision
requiring reassignment by the farmee will be enforced by the Court
following payout, if it occurs, as a formality signaling (sic) that reversion
has occurred." 231
Howell teaches two lessons, however. First, it suggests that a
farmout agreement should be worded specifically to make the accounting
obligation an obligation that will survive the termination or expiration of
the agreement.23 2 Second, the case shows the importance of
administering one's agreements -the court's interpretation of the contract

825 F.Supp. 278, 125 O&GR 613 (D. Wyo. 1993). Professor Gereau commented
on the case in Discussion Notes, 125 O&GR 626.
227
825 F.Supp. at 281.
228
Id. at 280.
229
!d.at 281.
226

230

Id. at 282.

Id. The court also refused to allow statutory liens to attach to farmor's retained
interest, holding that under the Wyoming statutory scheme no liens could attach to the
farmor without a contract stating that the farmor will assume responsibility for the costs.
Id. at 283.
232
The importance of specific language, at least in Oklahoma, is underscored by the
fate of Howell's claim for an equitable accounting. The district court denied the claim
because Howell had shown no proof that any amount was owed Howell. Id. at 620. The
Tenth Circuit court agreed with this interpretation of Oklahoma law. Id. This left Howell
in never-never land. Without an accounting there was no proof and without proof there
would be no accounting.
231
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language might well have been different had the original farmee been
more diligent in demanding accounting statements. 233
181 Operating Agreements/Unit Agreements
Farmout agreements often incorporate operating agreements or unit
agreements, either by attaching them or by reference. 234 What happens,
however, if the farmee does not execute the agreements referenced? In
Willard Pease Oil and Gas Co. v. Pioneer Oil and Gas Co., 235 the

Supreme Court of Utah held that a fact issue existed as to whether parties
who executed a farmout agreement that provided in part that "by your
acceptance of this Agreement you agree to adopt, ratify and confirm the
plan of unitization and Operating Agreement .... " became bound by the
unit agreements so as to be subject to a 300% penalty for not
participating in a development well. 236 Again, we see the importance of
precise words.
[91 Lease Payments
One of the important administrative problems that most farmout
agreements address is whether the farmor or the farmee is to make

payments that may come due under the farmed-out leases. The most
common structure provides that the farmor will make all payments until
the earned interest is assigned, subject to total or partial reimbursement
by the farmee. This structure usually makes administrative sense because
of the efficiencies of having the farmor, who already has the farmed-out
properties enrolled in its administrative system, handle the payments. 237
Imperial Oil of North Dakota, Inc. v. Consolidated Crude Oil Co.,

238

however, illustrates a risk to the farmee of relying on the farmor. In
Imperial Oil, the North Dakota Supreme Court upheld an order of lease
cancellation for failure to pay royalties even though the unpaid royalties
amounted to slightly more than $12,000 and the lessee's forfeiture loss
The need for diligence in asserting one's rights is also illustrated by KMI
Continental Offshore Production Co. v. ACF Petroleum Co., 746 S.W.2d 238, 104
O&GR 133 (Tex. App. Houston [Is1 Dist.] 1987, writ denied), where the court applied
laches to bar the exercise of an option to purchase which was to be exercised within 90
days of payout, because the information as to when payout occurred was in the control of
the plaintiffs. 746 S.W.2d at 244. The court observed that "the wells and land involved
are oil and gas property, which is inherently speculative. The longer one delays in acting
on an option concerning oil and gas property, the easier one is able to speculate on the
value of the property at the other's expense." Id. at 244-245. Professor Homer
commented on the case at 104 O&GR 147.
234
See SMU, supra n. 3, at 838.
235
899 P.2d 766, 132 O&GR 202 (Utah 1995).
236
899 P.2d at 768-769.
237
See SMU, supra n. 3, at 839-840.
238
851 F.2d 206, 100 O&GR 554 (8thCir. 1988). 851 F.2d at 210. North Dakota's
statutory scheme allows cancellation of lease for failure to pay royalties. N.D. Cent. Code
§ 47-16-39.1 (Supp.1985).
233
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would be approximately $691,000.239 Further, the court held that the
farmees of portions of the lessee's interests were not indispensable
parties to the suit. 240 The farmees therefore lost their entire interests in
the leased property without notice of the farmor's failure to pay. 241
Imperial Oil may turn on the failure of the farmees to record their
assignments, though the court does not mention that factor. It may also
be that the assignments in Imperial Oil were unusually worded; the court
observes that "the assignees ... were not parties to the leases ... the

assignees were merely assigned an interest in [the farmor's] rights under
the leases. 242 But if the farmees were assigned undivided interests in the
farmed-out leases and recorded those interests, they should have been
considered to be indispensable parties to the cancellation action.
In addition, of course, Imperial Oil is unusual because lease
cancellation for failure to pay royalty is a remedy available in only a few
states. Cambridge Oil Co. v. Huggins, 243 is a more representative
decision. There a farmee failed to make timely royalty payments,
breaching an amendment to a farmout agreement that gave a royalty
owner the right to "terminate the agreement" for non-payment of
royalty. 244 The court held that the language did not justify canceling
assignments that the farmee had previously received to property
surrounding producing oil wells because "courts will not declare
forfeiture unless they are compelled to do so by language which can be
construed in no other way.245 The court also rejected the royalty owner's
contention that the farmout agreement amendment imposed fiduciary
obligations upon the farmee because the farmee had agreed to pay
royalties "with more propriety than in the past,2 46 distinguishing Manges
v. Guerra,24 7 on the ground that in Manges, the benefits received by the
Guerras depended solely on Manges' management, while "here . .. the

relationship was strictly contractual.24 8
851 F.2d at 210. North Dakota's statutory scheme allows cancellation of lease for
failure to pay royalties. N.D. Cent. Code § 47-16-39.1 (Supp.1985).
240
Id. at 211.
239

As I noted at SMU, supra n. 3, at 840, a related issue is what liability, if any, the
farmor has to the farmee if loss of title results from the farmor's failure to make lease
payments properly. Farmout agreements usually disclaim any liability by the party
handling the payments.
242
851 F.2d at 211.
243
765 S.W.2d 540, 106 O&GR 318 (Tex. App. --Corpus Christi 1989, writ denied).
The case is the subject of a Discussion Note by Professor Homer at 106 O&GR 328.
244
765 S.W.2d at 542.
245
Id. at 543.
246
Id. at 542.
247
673 S.W.2d 180 (Tex. 1984).
241

248

765 S.W.2d at 544.
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[101 Dealing With Bankruptcy
The possibility that one's business partners will go bankrupt
inevitably enters into farmout-agreement planning. Bankruptcy may
throw the solvent as well as the insolvent into turmoil, as I have
previously observed. 249 Recent years have brought some good news,
however, at least for farmees. In Terry Oilfield Supply Co., Inc. v.
American Security Bank, NA., 250 in holding that the owner of a

production payment was entitled to a share of the proceeds of a take-orpay settlement 251 a federal district court reasoned that a Texas oil and
gas lease was not an executory contract subject to rejection by the trustee
under § 365 of the Bankruptcy Code 252 because, in Texas, the lease and a production payment carved from it - is "an interest in place," and
not executory regardless of what bankruptcy lawyers may think." 253 If an
oil and gas lease or production payment is not an executory interest,
neither will be a conditional-assignment farmout agreement. 254
This reasoning does not necessarily apply to those states that treat
oil and gas leases as licenses or other nonpossessory interests,
however. 2 5 So farmees greeted with relief the amendment of the
Bankruptcy Code in 1992 to exclude farmed-out interests from the
definition of the "property" of the bankrupt farmor's "estate," 256
regardless of the form of the farmout as an agreement to transfer or a
conditional assignment.
See SMU, supra n. 3, at 862.
195 B.R.66 (D. S.D. Tex. 1996).
251
1 am not certain that the court's conclusion is consistent with what I understand to
be Texas law. See generally John S. Lowe, "Defining the Royalty Obligation," 49 SMU
L.J. 223 (1996), reprinted at 33 PUB. LAND & RES. DIG. 257 (1996), and John S.
Lowe, "Royalty Calculation in Texas," Ch. 3 in Oil and Gas Law for a New Century:
Precedent as Prologue (Proceedings of the 50th Anniversary Celebration of the
Southwestern Legal Foundation, Matthew Bender, 1998).
252
11 U.S.C. § 365(a) (1998).
253
195 B.R. at 73.
254
See SMU, supra n. 3, at 864-865.
255
See W. L. NORTON, JR., NORTON BANKRUPTCY LAW AND PRACTICE
2D, §39:9, n. 10 (West 1998).
256
11 U.S.C. § 541(b)(4) (West 1999), which applies to all bankruptcies filed after
October 24, 1992, was buried in the 300+ page Energy Policy Act of 1992. It excludes
"any interest of the debtor in liquid or gaseous hydrocarbons to the extent that-(A)(i) the
debtor has transferred or has agreed to transfer such interest pursuant to a farmout
agreement or any written agreement directly related to a farmout agreement; and (ii) but
for the operation of this paragraph, the estate could include the interest referred to in
clause (i) only by virtue of section 365 or 544(a)(3) of this title." Subsection (B) then
specifically excludes production payments from the property of the estate. Subsection C
provides that retained non-operating interests and back-in rights of a debtor are a part of
the property of the estate.
249
250
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But neither the court's analysis in Terry Oiffield Supply nor the
statutory amendment completely solves the problem of the impact of
bankruptcy on farmout agreements. Bankruptcy is likely to result in
delays that destroy the business sense of the farmout transaction for both
farmors and farmees. The business paralysis usually associated with
bankruptcy is likely to cause a farmor to lose the farmed -out leases
when a farmee goes bankrupt. And a farmee is likely to encounter
difficulty obtaining clear title to its earned interests when a farmor goes
bankrupt. 257 The financial stability of one's business partners remains a
primary consideration in whether to make a deal.
IV. Conclusion

As I observed in 1987, farmors and farmees mutual interest in
maximizing available tax benefits causes the structure of farmout
agreements to be very much the same, or at least fall into discernable
patterns. 258 Farmout substantive provisions, however, vary widely. The
difference in substantive provisions results in part from the different
goals that farmors and farmees seek when they enter into agreements. 259
In part, the differences are reflexive; once one encounters a problem, one
drafts to avoid it in the future. In part, also, the differences show the
creativity of American businessmen and their lawyers in deal-making.
"Only the creativity of businessmen and their lawyers limits the variety
of provisions that may be included in a farmout agreement." 260
But surely the cases that I have reviewed in the pages above
illustrate that the transactional costs of drafting, administering and
litigating farmout agreements is high. Farmout agreements are
susceptible to orderly analysis, and over the years many distinguished
commentators have written to suggest particular approaches to that
analysis. 261 Is it not time for the industry and its lawyers to try again to
develop model forms? 262

257

The delay that I speculate will follow a farmee's request for assignment from a
bankruptcy trustee after drilling an earning well is a good reason for farmees to prefer
conditional assignment farmout agreements. The delay that I speculate will follow a
farmor's request for assignment of a back-in after payout is an equally good reason for
farmors to prefer agreement-to-transfer farmouts. See the discussion supra in the text
accompanying notes 108-123.
258
See SMU, supra n. 3, at 765-778.
259
Id. at 778-782
260

Id. at 867.

See id. at 760, n. 3, for a partial list.
The AAPL has prepared a "model" form, AAPL Form 635, but it is so skeletal that
it has not gained wide acceptance.
261
262
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